Book reviews by Dunlop, Charles E. M. et al.
Book Reviews 
J- Christopher Maloney, The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language, Cam- 
bridge University Press (1989), xxvii + 274 pages. 
Readers who have followed debates on mental representation through the paths 
charted by such luminaries as Fodor, Dennett, Stich, Putnam, Searle, and the 
Churchlands will recognize many familiar themes in J. Christopher Maloney’s 
contribution to the topic. Maloney has produced an admirably clear discussion of 
some key issues, and, while his own views and arguments generally owe a large 
debt to his precursors, he nonetheless manages to stake out a position with some 
distinctive features of its own. 
The book’s title actually promises less than its contents deliver. Yes, the 
“matter of the mental language” - in both senses - commands considerable atten- 
tion, though in neither sense is it “mundane”. But Maloney also comprehensively 
treats a variety of interrelated topics: modularity, rationality, qualia, the frame 
problem, and the origin of mental contents. Needless to say, any book that 
advances philosophical discussion of these issues cannot help but provoke sub- 
stantial controversies. Here I shall highlight just a few of them. 
Sententialism 
Taking folk psychology as its point of departure, Sententialism maintains that, for 
beliefs to be causally implicated in the production of rational behavior, they must 
constitute a series of (internal) physical states that stand to behavior in the 
relation of premises to conclusion. The causal efficacy of beliefs derives from 
certain of their physical (syntactic) properties, while their contribution to 
rationality centrally involves the fact that syntactic differences reflect different 
contents.1 Thus, beliefs are regarded as sentences, physically encoded. 
Although this characterization might suggest that beliefs are capable of arising 
in all sorts of entities, Maloney urges that intentionahty is present only when the 
underlying matter is of the right sort.’ (He agrees with Searle that instantiating a 
formal program is not by itself sufficient for mentality.) In humans, and probably 
many other animals, belief-sentences are hypothesized to be encoded neurally in 
“Mentalese”. It does not follow, however, that nezuaZ stuff affords the physical 
basis of intentionality, for neural-based Earthlings, along with non-neural Mar- 
tians and various artificial devices, could conceivably share (as yet unknown) 
physical constitutions supportive of intentionality. 
One advantage claimed for this viewpoint is that it averts the problem of 
infinitely embedded homunculi: Mentalese representations ultimately have con- 
Minds urzd Mzchines 1: 221. 1991. 
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tent for an agent, not by being interpreted (which would require yet another 
interpreting agent), but by springing from a particular kind of material. At the 
same time, as Maloney recognizes, the proposal that intentionality arises naturally 
and exclusively from “the right stuff” courts psychological chauvinism, for it 
introduces the possibility that various entities, despite whatever behavior they 
might exhibit, may be deemed bereft of mentality. Maloney does not propose to 
resolve that issue speculatively, however. What he puts forward instead is the 
hypothesis that intentionality is a natural kind, the material makeup of which is to 
be illuminated by future scientific research. The results could be quite surprising: 
It is consistent with the prevailing hypothesis to suppose that the study of cognitive processes will 
someday yield a radically new taxonomy of physical states according to which organic and inorganic 
devices are comprehended by a natural physical kind, membership in which ensures the possession of 
contentful mental states. (p. 177) 
Of course, it may turn out that no such material basis of cognition is to be found. 
In any case, although Maloney is rather vague about the details of that envisioned 
research (the issue is briefly addressed on pp. 73n-74n), he does not appear to 
think that it will undermine the importance of the neurosciences in studying 
cognition. 
Notation and Content 
According to Sententialism (pp. 33-46, 124-139 paxsim), sameness of belief is 
determined syntactically.3 The argument is that (a) the same beliefs should 
produce the same behavior, while differences in belief should make a behavioral 
difference; (b) syntactic sameness and difference is presumably reflected in neural 
codings, thus yielding a low-level causal account of behavioral sameness and 
divergence. 
But a syntactic criterion for sameness of belief appears to conflict with a 
behavioral criterion, as the following example suggests (p. 34). Suppose that 
computer scientists someday create two (notationally distinct) programs - call 
them ABELARD PRIMTJS and ABELARD SECUNDUS - both of which drive devices that 
perfectly simulate the behavior of Abelard in his affair with Heloise.4 Suppose 
further that the notation employed by SECUNDUS differs significantly from PRIMUS'S 
notation (perhaps they involve different higher-level programming languages). 
PRIMUS in fact may not reflect the beliefs of Abelard, but, even if it did, the 
existence of SECUNDUS would show that syntactically divergent representations can 
produce identical behavior. Sameness of behavior argues for sameness of beliefs. 
Yet this result seems to contradict Sententialism’s insistence upon a syntactic 
criterion for belief sameness, since PRIMUS and SECUNDUS are different programs. 
Suppose now that the programs are compiled into machine language. Maloney 
asks whether the resulting compilations produce the same machine language. If 
so, he argues, we don’t really have alternative notations after all.’ It is not clear 
BOOKREVIEWS 223 
how Maloney is construing “same machine language” here, but it would surely be 
too strong to insist that two programs are compiled into the same machine 
language only if their resulting binary codes are identical. (Compare: “Humlet 
and ZGzg Lear are translated into Morse code only if the resulting strings of dots 
and dashes are identical.“) Assume that PRIMUS and SECUNDUS run on identical 
hardware. The compilations of their higher-level program code will then yield 
non-identical machine-code - in the same machine language. So, pace Maloney. it 
appears that PRIMUS and SECUNDUS might well operate with syntactically divergent 
representations that cause identical behavior. 
But is the example of the three Abelards ultimately consistent? Maloney 
suggests that it may not be. Beliefs with different contents, he insists, must issue 
in some behavioral differences as well. To illustrate, he proposes that a “tracer” 
program be attached to the executing programs of both PRIMUS and SECUNDUS. 
(The tracer simply reports on what code is executing in each, e.g., “A is now 
being implemented” or “B is now executing”.) Since PRIMUS and SECUNDUS 
contain notational differences, their respective tracers will yield different reports 
at different stages of program execution. The tracers’ reports, Maloney argues, 
demonstrate behavioral differences “latent” in the operations of the two pro- 
grams. 
It is not clear that this scenario advances the Sententiahst’s case, however. The 
example of PRIMUS and SECUNDUS, after all, was introduced to show that identical 
behavior of cognitive agents need not stem from identical beliefs. The behavior 
initially to be simulated-aspects of Abelard’s affair with Heloise - was far 
removed from the “latent behavior” revealed by tracer programs. Furthermore, 
even with the introduction of tracers, the only behavioral differences appearing 
are something akin to introspective reports concerning Mentalese structures; yet, 
since Sententialism does not presuppose that cognitive agents have introspective 
access to those structures (p. 19), the 6‘latent behavior” (revealed by the tracers) 
in PRIMUS and SECUNDUS seems irrelevant. 
Maloney’s example of PRIMUS and SECUNDUS pointed to a conflict between 
syntactic and behavioral critera for sameness of Mentalese content. Ultimately, 
however, Sententialism does not advocate a simple behavioral criterion for 
content. Rather, in endorsing what it calls “doxastic holism” (pp. 124-139; cf. 
202-219), Sententialism maintains that the content of a Mentalese token is fixed, 
not in isolation, but by taking into account its causal transactions with other 
mental structures, along with behavior in which it is implicated-in short, a 
functional specification of content. Even so, a conflict similar to the one drawn 
above can be generated. Consider two cognitive agents, A and B, both of whom 
hold the same belief (e.g., that John F. Kennedy was assassinated). Assume that 
both agents acquired their beliefs under similar circumstances, perhaps by watch- 
ing the same television news broadcast. Now, it seems perfectly possible that the 
Mentalese token T, which in A records that belief, might also occur somewhere in 
B - yet, a functionaI specification could well assign different content to B’s token 
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T.6 But, still supposing A and B to hold the same belief, not only does the 
syntactic criterion require that A and B both token identical Mentalese sentences, 
Sententialism also insists that both sentences have the sume content. So, at this 
juncture, the syntactic criterion for belief sameness and the functional specifica- 
tion of belief content appear to be at loggerheads. Should we seek to reassign 
content in the mental structures of one agent in order to bring the two criteria 
into alignment?’ If so, which one should we change, and why? Perhaps, instead, if 
content is to be preserved, the syntactic criterion should be abandoned. 
Original Meaning 
Since Mentalese is not taken by Sententialism to be purely syntactic, an explana- 
tion of its semantic force must be provided. One well-known account of mental 
content claims that the meanings of Mentalese terms are endogenous, not 
acquired. Maloney eschews this path, opting instead for a causal theory of 
content. The first task, then, is to show how content can initially arise without 
presupposing antecedent contentful states. 
Not surprisingly, the story begins with sensation; sensory states are regarded as 
Mentalese tokens. (Although this point is not argued for explicitly, it seems 
necessary, granting that we can form beliefs about what we perceive.) Suppose, 
for example, that an apple’s being red causes Abelard to be in physical state s 
(pp. 18lff). L? turns out to be a complex state, involving subject and predicate. 
Although in English we might describe the subject as “that apple” and the 
predicate as “being red”, Maloney urges that purely sensory states are much more 
semantically attenuated than the English expressions suggest. The subject of a 
sensury representation is akin to a demonstrative such as “this”, while the 
associated predicate is equally impoverished - something akin to “that”. At this 
first level of representation, then, neither the apple nor the property of being red 
is represented as such. Rather, the sensory mechanism isolates a subject and 
property, and predicates the latter of the former, without having categorized 
either (e.g., “This is that”). Sensory demonstratives refer and sensory predicates 
predicate “in the most pristine way without assistance from other lexical items” 
(p. 184). 
Presumably, however, other pristine demonstratives and predicates can render 
assistance. How else could the referent of “this” be isolated from many other 
possible referents in a sensory array? Furthermore, since pristine predications 
occur in a variety of circumstances, in which various properties are assigned to 
various subjects, each pristine predication must have a unique syntax - otherwise, 
they would all have the same content (cf. Note 1). Maloney accommodates this 
point by proposing that Mentalese contains “a unique demonstrative referential 
type for each object of sensuous reference” (p. 190).’ But while this proposal may 
circumvent the problem just mentioned, it does so by burgeoning the vocabulary 
of Mentalese beyond plausibility.’ (Consider the effect of introducing a new 
demonstrative in English for each object of reference.) 
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Turning now to perhaps the most fundamental question, wherein lies the 
referential character of Mentalese demonstratives and predicates? According to 
Maloney, Mentalese demonstratives 
refer simply by virtue of being caused to occur, and they select as their referents the objects that cause 
them to occur without regard for any other characteristics these objects might possess (p. 184). 
Pristinely attributed properties are, yes, given in sensation (p. 187n). 
Thus, the ultimate semantic basis of Mentalese, it appears, is a kind of referential 
primitive, simply to be accepted. But then is there really any reason to abjure 
nativism, at least insofar as the most referentially frugal Mentalese sentences are 
concerned? In the final analysis, both nativism and “the given” appear to leave 
the source of reference equally unexplained. 
The claim that some contents are simply “given”, of course, drives a wedge 
between sensuous and non-sensuous Mentalese representations, since the con- 
tents of the latter were said to be fixed holistically through functional specifica- 
tions. At the same time, Maloney argues that the contents of the one ultimately 
give rise to the contents of the other. It is hard to know at this point whether the 
bifurcation just noted creates a significant difficulty, since he offers just a sketch 
of how the transformation from sensuous to non-sensuous representation might 
take place. Further investigation of this topic would be welcome. (Computational 
models of vision, while they may provide some important guidance in this area, 
are still very much in their infancy.) 
Appealing to “the given” does raise a certifiable objection, however, since a 
familiar contrary doctrine maintains that observation terms are rzol purely given, 
but are always theory-laden. Maloney’s reply is as follows: 
But pristine attributives are so bereft of semantic force that it is hard to see how they could be subject 
to the influence of believed theories and spoken, entrenched languages. (p. 187n) 
Clearly, there is not much room to maneuver here. On the one hand, these initial 
Mentalese attributions, semantically impoverished though they may be, must have 
content sufficient to permit cognitive agents ultimately to “bootstrap” their way 
up to the full range of their mental representations. On the other hand, those 
same pristine beginnings are said to be so devoid of content that they are immune 
to the difficulties just outlined. 
Additional Topics 
Beyond the themes briefly touched upon in this review, there are many others 
deserving of attention. Among them are (1) the range of an agent’s actions 
(Maloney’s account seems rather promiscuous), (2) conceptual development and 
the question of ambiguity in Mentalese (Maloney’s repeated appeal to degrees of 
Mentalese conceptual mastery. appears to concede a fair amount to his objectors), 
and (3) Nagel’s worries about “objective” knowledge of “subjective” experience 
(Maloney argues that knowing the syntax of a bat’s Mentalese, as it is realized in 
a bat’s sensory system, would tell us all there is to know about the qualia of 
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bats - although this would admittedly not produce in us e.xperience.s had by bats). 
Anyone who has pondered these and related matters from alternative perspec- 
tives will find much in Maloney’s book to respond to; readers seeking a survey of 
the current intellectual landscape will find it a stimulating and highly responsible 
guide 
Notes 
’ *&Thus. Sententtalism abjures strict synonymy in Mentalese. It insists that within a mental language 
every noruno& dtfference amounts to a semantic difference” (p. 42n). 
’ This does not mean that matter determines the content of particular states: “The matter of a state 
may be what renders it intentional: its functional role may be at least part of what settles its content” 
(P. 29). 
’ This claim is relativized to languages. Maloney suggests that differences in mental languages may 
distinguish cognitive kinds. Since the same representation, notated differently, might appear in 
different kinds of agents, functional considerations would presumably be required to indivrduate 
beliefs across cognitive kinds (cf. p. 182). 
’ This thought experiment has a real-life analogue already causing a legal stir: court cases currently 
abound as software companies complain that competitors have produced programs whose operation is 
identical to their own, even though the underlying code may be considerably different. 
’ He also argues that if &flerenr machine language results from each of the two compilations. we 
would have something tantamount to different kinds of cognitive agents. In that case, notational 
differences would not automatically imply differences in belief. (See Note 3.) 
’ In that case, of course. JYs belief about JFK would be carried by some other token, say U. 
’ An alternative ploy would be to claim that, despite all appearances so far, the two Mentalese tokens 
are nevertheless of the same notational type and (consequently) have the same content. Functional 
specification, then, would severely constrain what counts as notational variation. Maloney nods briefly 
in that direction at one point (p. 42). but, significantly, his discussion elsewhere (e.g., pp. 124-139) 
does not seem to presume such a strategy. 
’ A similar strategy, incidentally, is introduced to handle indexicals (p. 137). 
’ Actually. the problem is far worse than it first appears. Not only do demonstratives multiply out of 
control. but pristine predicates may do so even to a greater degree. Each pristine predication is 
associated with a distinct Mentalese predicate type (p. 191). But. further. pristine predicates at the 
level of Mentalese may be far more discriminating than predication in English would reveal. For 
example, it mtght turn out that no two objects are exactly the same shade of red; if so, and if each 
different shade causally produced a different type of sensory state, a different pristine predtcate would 
be applied to each shade (p. 187n). 
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Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack (eds.), Intentions in 
Communication, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1990, x + 508, $45.00. 
Zntentions in Communication is the proceedings of an interdisciplinary workshop 
held in Monterey, California, in March 1987. The collection brings together the 
Minds and Machines 1: 224. 1991 
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work of prominent researchers in computer science, artificial intelligence, linguis- 
tics, philosophy, and psychology whose theories of communication rely on a 
careful account of the intentions and plans of the communicating agent. Thirteen 
papers that were presented at the workshop are included in this volume, along 
with seven commentaries that are used to integrate the work by comparing and 
contrasting pairs of papers. The one exception is the work of Janet Pierrehumbert 
and Julia Hirschberg, which is reviewed separately because it represents a 
departure from the rest. A fourteenth paper, by Herbert H. Clark and Deanna 
Wilkes-Gibbs was added to the collection because it was relevant to one of the 
workshop topics. 
The editors have written an introductory chapter which includes a brief 
background on work in planning, action, and communication. This work forms a 
continuum not only with respect to time, but also approach, stretching from 
traditional work in philosophy and linguistics on theoretical semantics to relatively 
recent work in artificial intelligence and psychology on discourse understanding. 
The editors summarize this research as addressing different subsets of six central 
questions with respect to communication and discourse. The first question con- 
cerns characterizing meaning in a way that is appropriate for all kinds of 
expressions. The second question, of compositionahty, pertains to relating the 
meaning of a complex expression to the meanings of its parts. The third question, 
action, is concerned with how the utterance of a sentence succeeds in performing 
acts in addition to the act of saying. The answer to this is perhaps related to the 
answer to the fourth question, that is, how it is that the utterance of a sentence 
can convey something more than, or different from, its literal meaning. The fifth 
question concerns discourse compositionality, how it is that the meaning of a 
connected discourse is more than the sum of the meanings of the sentences that 
compose it. Finally, the answers to these questions are related to answering a 
sixth question: What is communication? 
The editors propose that any viable theory of communication must address all 
six questions. Moreover, to achieve this, such a theory will have to take into 
account the role of intention. Speaker intention functions as a guide for planning 
what to say; for the hearer, it serves as an underlying assumption for interpreting 
what has been said. The background material helps the reader to focus on the 
issues this research is concerned with, but it is insufficient to make the reading 
accessible to someone unfamiliar with the area. The second half of the intro- 
duction clarifies the organization of the collection into three sections. This is 
good, since the organization is not apparent from the physical layout. Within each 
section, a comprehensive overview of each of the papers is given, emphasizing the 
relationships of key ideas between successive papers. This helps to create a 
transitional ordering of papers from the beginning of each section to the end. 
The papers in the first section are concerned with characterizing intention. The 
first paper, “What is Intention. Y by philosopher Michael Bratman, examines the 
role that intentions play in focusing and constraining the reasoning of an agent. In 
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the following paper, ‘6Persistence, Intention, and Commitment”, Philip R. Cohen 
and Hector J. Levesque use many of Bratman’s notions in a model presented as a 
modal, first-order logic. The third and fourth papers change the focus from 
planning to plan recognition. In the third paper, “Plans as Complex Mental 
Attitudes”, Martha Pollack develops her theory of plan recognition around a 
model for the complex mental attitude of “having a plan”. She suggests that an 
adequate theory of cooperative communication must concern itself with the 
structure of this attitude. The final paper of this section, “A Circumscriptive 
Theory of Plan Recognition” by Henry Kautz, presents a formal theory of plan 
recognition using circumscription. The analysis is aimed at unintended plan 
recognition, but Kautz argues that his approach applies to intended plan recogni- 
tion as well, the kind found in speech-act recognition. 
The traditional view of sentence meaning holds that the semantic content of a 
sentence is its truth value (Tarski, 1956). In contrast, speech act theory suggests 
that speech is best viewed as purposeful action used by speakers to change the 
mental state of another agent (Austin, 1962). The second section comprises seven 
papers (half the book) spanning the full range of research approaches to 
communication. The common thread among the papers is that they all move in 
the direction of resolving the two interpretations of sentence meaning. I will 
mention four of these papers here. In “An Application of Default Logic to 
Speech Act Theory”, C. Raymond Perrault presents a model of discourse in 
which the effects of speech acts are modeled as defaults in a nonmonotonic logic. 
For example, that a speaker believes what he asserts is a default assumption. “On 
the Unification of Speech Act Theory and Formal Semantics”, by philosopher 
Daniel Vanderverken, attempts to relate the speech-act properties of sentences to 
their truth-conditional ones by distinguishing two sets of semantic values, those 
relating to the success of the spoken sentence and those relating to the truth 
conditions of the propositional content of the sentence. In their second paper of 
this volume, “Rational Interaction as the Basis for Communication”, Cohen and 
Levesque argue that what is communicated in an utterance is a propositional 
attitude expressing the speaker’s mental state. In a slight departure from the rest, 
“The Meaning of Intonational Contours in Discourse”, by Janet Pierrehumbert 
and Julia Hirschberg, investigates the role that intonation contour plays in 
analyzing the beliefs and attitudes of a speaker. 
To underscore the volume’s theme, a short third section includes three papers 
that return to the issue of the nature of intention in communication. Unlike the 
first section, these three papers emphasize that discourse is a collective act 
involving both the speaker and hearer. In the first paper, “Collective Intentions 
and Actions”, philosopher John Searle theorizes that collective behavior is not 
the summation of the individual behaviors of the participants. Instead, he argues 
that collective behavior is guided by collective intentions. Furthermore, he 
suggests that due to this collective intentionality, each agent intends to achieve 
the collective goal by having an individual intention to do his part. In the next 
paper, “Plans for Discourse”, computer scientists Barbara Grosz and Candice 
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Sidner develop a formal analysis for joint plans, which differs from Searle’s in that 
two agents mutually believe that each agent intends to do his part and that each 
agent will do his part if and only if the other agent does his. Finally, in “Referring 
as a Collaborative Process”, psychologists Herbert H. Clark and Deanna Wilkes- 
Gibbs supply data from a referential communication task. They argue that their 
results support the claim that referring is a collaborative action involving the 
hearer as we11 as the speaker. 
Some excellent commentaries help the reader to focus on the main ideas in 
these papers by carefully comparing approaches, highlighting relative strengths 
and weaknesses, and thus identifying issues for further research. A good example 
is James Allen’s discussion of Michael Bratman’s process account for the intended 
and unintended consequences of plans. Allen compares it to the model of 
intention proposed by Cohen and Levesque in which intention is a modal 
operator. He suggests how Bratman’s theory can be made more precise, and he 
raises issues for Cohen and Levesque to address so that their model provides 
better coverage. A few commentators use the papers they critique as a spring- 
board for presenting their own work. This results in some interesting papers in 
their own right. For example, noting some difficulties with the paper on speech 
acts by Vanderverken, and the second paper by Cohen and Levesque on the 
same, Jerrold Sadock presents a new scheme for understanding the structure of, 
and the relationships among, illocutionary acts. 
Collections of this kind are useful because they provide a broad snapshot of the 
work in an area. The book purports to be interdisciplinary, addressing the issue of 
intention as it arises in different areas of research in communication and 
discourse. In reality, the collection seems to concentrate on approaches involving 
formal semantic theories. This is clear from the list of contributors, which includes 
eight philosophers and linguists and three researchers in computer science and 
artificial intelligence who rely heavily on the philosophical literature. In fact, only 
two papers directly use empirical research, and these are not integrated with the 
other papers (the papers by Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg and by Clark and 
Wilkes-Gibbs). However, this volume is essential reading for anyone in any 
discipline who is interested in speech act planning, speech act recognition, and 
discourse interpretation. 
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Tom Forester and Perry Morrison, Computer Ethics, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 1990, 193 pages. 
Computer Ethics is a welcome addition to the growing number of books that 
address ethical issues in computing. The subtitle of the book, “Cautionary Tales 
and Ethical Dilemmas in Computing”, summarizes the contents of the book well. 
The book is largely a collection of up-to-date stories of malfunctions and misuses 
of computers. Computer Ethics is in the category of consciousness-raising books. 
The primary purpose of the book is to send a wake-up message to those, 
particularly computer science students, who think there are no ethical issues in 
computing. As the authors state, the book has “. . . the simple aim of sensitizing 
undergraduate computer science students to ethical issues.” (p. viii) 
The book is sensibly organized around standard themes. Following an intro- 
ductory chapter, the book has chapters on computer crime, software theft, 
hacking and viruses unreliable computers, invasion of privacy, AI and expert 
systems, and computerizing the workplace. An appendix contains a discussion of 
“Star Wars”, the Strategic Defense Initiative. Each of the chapters contains a 
bevy of relevant examples and some discussion of the issues. The chapter on 
hacking and viruses gives a nice list of definitions of terms, such as “Trojan 
horse”, “logic bomb”, “virus”, “vaccine”, “worm”, and “tempest”, which might 
be familiar to, but not clearly understood by, some students. The book is easy to 
read and contains numerous interesting tidbits of information. Did you know that, 
at least according to one survey, the most common passwords in Britain are 
“Fred”, “God”, “Pass”, and “Genius”, as well as names of spouses and family 
pets, whereas in the United States the favorite password is “Love”, closely 
followed by “Sex”? (p. 21) 
The teaching strength of the book lies in its presentation and discussion of 
numerous contemporary examples that most students should find relevant and 
engaging. The book is more current than other recent books such as SiZicon Shock 
(Simons, 1985) and The High Cost of High Tech (Siegel and Markoff, 1985). 
However, for number of examples and depth of analysis on just the issues of 
privacy and surveillance, The Rise of the Computer State (Burnham, 1983) is still 
the best choice. 
Another teaching strength of the book is the presentation of a hypothetical case 
study at the end of each chapter. These cases are well-written and ought to 
generate good class discussions. The authors clearly have this in mind and suggest 
that members of the class might do some role-playing in some of the cases. Ethical 
Cor@cts in Information and Computer Science, Technology, and Business (Par- 
ker, Swope, and Baker, 1990) has more hypothetical case studies, but the 
hypothetical cases in Computer Ethics are better developed and are designed, of 
course, for discussion of the issues raised earlier in each chapter. 
One weakness in the book is the absence of a coherent ethical theory and its 
application to the ethical problems. As the authors readily admit, “Readers will 
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notice that we have not adopted an explicit theoretical framework and have 
avoided philosophical discussion of ethical theory.” (p. viii) It is somewhat 
strange that a book on computer ethics would omit a discussion of something as 
central as ethical theory, but, in fairness, this omission seems to be more the rule 
than the exception in books on computer ethics. Certainly, the book should be 
supplemented with some discussion of ethical theory and perhaps used with a 
book like Computer Ethics (Johnson, 1985), which does integrate ethical theory 
with ethical issues in computing. 
Computer ethics is not simply the application of ethics to computing but 
requires conceptual analyses of computing situations. Different conceptions can 
lead to different ethical judgments. To its credit, Computer Ethics emphasizes 
some of the differences created by computers. For example, as the authors 
discuss, breaking into a computer system is not completely analogous to a typical 
physical break-in (p. 60). Normally, nothing is broken as one breaks into a 
computer system; nothing like a physical lock need be damaged. One can steal 
information without removing anything; all of the original information is still 
there. One can browse through files without disturbing the contents. If nothing is 
altered, who is harmed by such activity? Of course, understandings of computer 
break-ins that stress similarities to typical physical break-ins and harm generated 
are equally possible. It is wise to consider the merits of different conceptualiza- 
tions, for differences in ethical judgments may depend as much upon differences 
in how situations are conceived as upon differences in ethical values. Geting clear 
about how to conceptualize a computing situation is half the job of computer 
ethics. 
Computer Ethics has a casual, almost journalistic, style that makes it easy to 
read. However, in some places, the style seems too loose for careful analysis. For 
example, in a discussion of the nature of intelligence and AI, the authors say, 
“ . . . it has been claimed by some that both Joseph Weizenbaum’s program, 
ELIZA, which simulates a Rogerian psychotherapist’s conversation, and Kenneth 
Colby’s PARRY program, which simulates a paranoid schizophrenic, are able to 
satisfy the Turing test.” (p. 116). As far as I know, nobody claims that both 
ELIZA and PARRY can pass the Turing test or that either one can. Joseph 
Weizenbaum was impressed with how some people got taken in by ELIZA, but 
that’s not passing the Turing test (cf. Weizenbaum, 1976). Kenneth Colby states 
very clearly that his tests for PARRY are modifications of the Turing test 
restricted to pyschiatric parameters, and he doesn’t believe that PARRY would 
pass a regular Turing test (cf. Colby and Hilf, 1973). These programs are not a 
basis for any ambiguity about the Turing test, contrary to what the authors 
suggest. 
In another place, the authors say “. . . there may be at least one way in which 
AI could be unambiguously (in our minds anyway) considered an improper goal 
for society - that is because of its funding base and clear links with the military 
establishments of both the US and the UK.” (p. 130) Unless the authors wish to 
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defend pacifism, which they don’t do, why is the funding base and links with the 
military a sufficient ground for classifying AI as an improper goal for society? 
What really bothers the authors, as I think it should, is the proposed use of AI to 
operate extremely complex systems, like those of the Strategic Defense Initiative. 
Putting an unproven control system in charge of nuclear defenses could easily lead 
to disastrous consequences. But this kind of argument is most forceful when it is 
given as an empirical argument about the probability of malfunction rather than 
as a purely antimilitary argument. I certainly share the authors’ concern about the 
introduction of AI on the battlefield. Another worthwhile, recent book that 
critically examines the military use of computers is Computers iz Buttle (Bellin 
and Chapman, 1987). 
Although I have some philosophical quibbles with Computer Ethics, I have no 
hesitation in recommending it as a good source of examples for a course or part of 
a course on computer ethics. Consciousness-raising is its stated aim, and it 
succeeds admirably. 
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